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Certainty and our sense of acquaintance with experiences 
 
Abstract: Why do we tend to think that phenomenal consciousness poses a hard problem? The 
answer seems to lie in part in the fact that we have the impression that phenomenal experiences 
are presented to us in a particularly immediate and revelatory way: we have a sense of 
acquaintance with our experiences. Recent views have offered resources to explain such 
persisting impression, by hypothesizing that the very design of our cognitive systems inevitably 
leads us to hold beliefs about our own experiences with certainty. I argue against this kind of 
“designed certainty” views. First, I claim that it is doubtful that we really hold beliefs about our 
own experiences with certainty – in any sense of certainty that would make our phenomenal 
beliefs special. Second, I claim that, even if it were the case that we hold beliefs about 
experiences with certainty, this would fall short of explaining our sense of acquaintance. 
1. Introduction1 
Many philosophers think that phenomenal consciousness poses a hard problem (Chalmers, 
1995): it seems extremely difficult to explain why the functioning of the brain gives rise to 
phenomenal experiences. It has been recently suggested that, in order to approach this hard 
problem, we should solve first the meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018): that is, 
we should explain how and why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. One 
fact seems particularly operative in our thinking that phenomenal consciousness poses a hard 
problem: the fact that we have a sense of acquaintance with our phenomenal experiences. We 
have the impression that experiences are presented to us in some sort of peculiarly direct, 
concrete, immediate and revelatory way. Solving the meta-problem thus seems to require 
explaining our sense of acquaintance with experiences. 
A recent promising line of thought has lately been gaining traction (Clark et al., 2019; Schwarz, 
2018, 2019). According to this line of thought, our sense that experiences are presented in a 
peculiarly immediate and revelatory way, itself crucial for our impression that consciousness is 
                                                     
1 I would like to thank the audience at the ANU as well as Wolfgang Schwarz for their comments. 




mysterious and puzzling, can be explained by the fact that our cognitive systems are designed 
to hold propositions about their own experiences with certainty – as it is advantageous for them 
to do so. I argue against such “designed certainty views”, by showing that they cannot account 
for our sense of acquaintance with experiences. Indeed, while I take it that we do have a sense 
of acquaintance with our experiences, it is very doubtful that we hold beliefs about them with 
certainty (at least not in a distinctive sense of certainty, that would make phenomenal beliefs 
special). Moreover, even if we did, this would fall short of explaining our sense of acquaintance 
with experiences. Indeed, our sense of acquaintance is not constituted (nor systematically 
caused) by such certainty of phenomenal beliefs. 
After some definitions (§2), I present various attempts at explaining our sense of acquaintance, 
and I focus on designed certainty views (§3). I raise a first problem for designed certainty views: 
I argue that we do not really hold beliefs about our own experiences with certainty – at least 
not in a sense of “certainty” that would make phenomenal beliefs special (§4). I then raise a 
second problem for designed certainty views: I argue that, even if we were distinctively certain 
of our experiences, this would fall short of explaining our sense of acquaintance (§5). I then 
close with some concluding remarks (§6). 
2. Phenomenal consciousness and our sense of acquaintance with experiences 
Phenomenal experiences (or “phenomenal states”, “conscious experiences”) are putative 
mental states endowed with phenomenal properties (or “qualia”). In virtue of these phenomenal 
properties, there is “something it is like” to be in these states. Smelling a rose, seeing a red 
cherry, feeling pain in one’s tooth when one undergoes dentistry: these states are typical 
examples of phenomenal experiences. A subject who enters such states is phenomenally 
conscious and possesses phenomenal consciousness. It is usually admitted that phenomenal 
consciousness can be distinguished, at least conceptually, from access consciousness – access-
conscious states being defined as mental states, the content of which is available for use in 
reasoning and rational control of speech and action (Block, 1995). 




Phenomenal consciousness is often said to create a “hard problem” (Chalmers, 1995) for the 
science of the mind. Why do brain processes (a set of chemical and electrical processes) give 
rise to phenomenal experiences, endowed with genuine phenomenal properties? This problem 
seems particularly puzzling. It differs from the “easy problems” of consciousness – the 
problems of explaining how brain processes can fulfill all kinds of functions usually associated 
with consciousness (detecting and categorizing stimuli, integrating information, reporting 
internal states, etc.). 
David Chalmers, who coined the label “hard problem”, has recently argued that one way to 
shed light on this seemingly intractable hard problem might be to solve another, easy problem, 
which bears a close relationship to the hard problem: the meta-problem of consciousness. The 
meta-problem is, roughly, the problem of explaining why we think that phenomenal 
consciousness poses a hard problem. More precisely, solving the meta-problem means giving 
a physical and/or functional explanation of various problem intuitions (intuitions that 
phenomenal consciousness is puzzling and hard to explain). These intuitions must themselves 
be conceived in a purely physico-functional manner (say, as dispositions to produce certain 
judgments functionally conceived, or certain utterances), for the meta-problem to constitute a 
genuine easy problem. 
Chalmers considers many intuitions to be part of the explanandum of the meta-problem: 
explanatory intuitions (intuitions that consciousness is hard to explain), metaphysical intuitions 
(intuitions that consciousness is not purely physico-functional), modal intuitions (intuitions that 
the phenomenal can be decorrelated from the physico-functional), knowledge intuitions 
(intuitions that the first-person perspective offers a special kind of knowledge of consciousness 
– for example, that Mary, the brilliant neuroscientist who lives in a black-and-white room, does 
not fully know what an experience of red is before she has one), etc. One of them, in the vicinity 
of knowledge intuitions, deserves particular attention: what Chalmers calls our sense of 
acquaintance with experiences. We have the impression that we are acquainted with our 
phenomenal experiences in some sort of distinctive way (we do not have the same sense of 
acquaintance with external physical events, or with dispositional mental states). What does this 
sense of acquaintance exactly consist in? Chalmers thinks that it has two components 
(Chalmers, 2018, p. 25): first, a sense of presentation, as we have the impression that, when we 




introspect, our phenomenal experiences are presented to us in some sort of direct, concrete and 
immediate way (for this distinction, see also Goff, 2017). Second, a sense of revelation – we 
have the impression that introspective presentations of phenomenal experiences give us the full 
nature of phenomenal properties.2 
Chalmers notes that this intuition of acquaintance is crucial to our impression that 
consciousness poses a hard problem: “one could argue that it is the sense of acquaintance 
specifically [that] plays the central role in generating our puzzlement about consciousness” 
(Chalmers, 2018, p. 25). He also remarks that the intuition of revelation (a component of the 
intuition of acquaintance) has been identified both by prominent materialists (Lewis, 1995) and 
anti-materialists (Goff, 2017) as the crucial intuition that must be rejected (or embraced) in 
order to make their case. I agree with this diagnosis. Without a strong intuition of revelation, I 
do not think that many of us would experience such intuitive resistance to the (standard) 
physicalist view that phenomenal consciousness is nothing over and above certain physical-
functional processes (Dretske, 1995; Smart, 1959). Such a statement is arguably at odds with 
what introspection presents of consciousness, but this creates an issue only because we tend to 
think that consciousness really has the nature that introspection presents. If we did not have a 
strong intuition of presentation, on the other hand, I do not think that we would intuitively resist 
“strong illusionist” materialists so much when they state that phenomenal consciousness just 
does not exist, although it seems to exist (Frankish, 2016). This thesis seems preposterous and 
obviously false to many of us, mainly because we have a strong sense that phenomenal 
experiences are immediately and concretely presented to us when we have them (they are 
“present in person”, so to speak), in a way that leaves no room for doubt. 
There are debates regarding the distribution and the robustness of problem intuitions. Are all of 
these intuitions universally shared, or at least widely shared (Irvine, 2019; Sytsma & Machery, 
2010; Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019)? How robust are they? – how dependent on cultural (Balmer, 
2020), sociological (Lau & Michel, 2019) and/or linguistic (Wierzbicka, 2010, 2019) factors 
are they? I will set these debates aside here. I follow Chalmers in assuming claims (A-C): (A) 
                                                     
2 In Chalmers’ paper, it is not clear whether this “sense of acquaintance” is a genuine problem intuition (a certain 
disposition to believe something about consciousness), or something more general, that gives rise to a series of 
problem intuitions. I will set aside this worry here: I will talk indifferently of the “sense” of acquaintance and of 
the “intuition” of acquaintance. 




Problem intuitions are widely (if not universally) shared among adult humans. (B) They have a 
high degree of robustness and are largely cognitively impenetrable. (C) The intuition of 
acquaintance (with its two components: presentation and revelation) features among problem 
intuitions3, and it is particularly crucial in generating and maintaining our impression that 
consciousness poses a hard problem. 
3. Explaining our sense of acquaintance 
 
A. Some attempts at explaining our sense of acquaintance 
There have been numerous attempts at giving a physico-functional explanation of our sense of 
acquaintance with experiences. I intend to examine and criticize one particular line of thought, 
first presented by Wolfgang Schwarz (Schwarz, 2018, 2019) and endorsed, with some 
modifications, by Andy Clark, Karl Friston and Sam Wilkinson (Clark et al., 2019). However, 
before I turn to this line of thought, a few words about other physicalist takes on our sense of 
acquaintance. 
First, there have been recent attempts at giving physicalist conceptions of acquaintance itself. 
Some philosophers have tried to understand how acquaintance (Balog, 2012; Coleman, 2018), 
or something in the vicinity (Kriegel, 2009), can be naturalized and physically realized. I will 
not focus on their attempts here. Indeed, the project of explaining acquaintance (especially 
considered in some sort of watered-down physicalist version) is different from the project of 
explaining our sense of acquaintance. One can claim that some physical states of our brain, say, 
                                                     
3 An influential line of thinking, initiated by Harman and Tye (Harman, 1990; Tye, 2002), claims that experiences 
are transparent: the only qualities we introspectively find in experiences are qualities of objects, not of experiences 
themselves. Proponents of transparency might be interpreted as stating that we do not have a sense of acquaintance 
with experiential qualities. This suggests that the intuition of acquaintance is not widely shared after all – as it 
would not be shared by the numerous philosophers who are attracted to the transparency thesis! However, the 
transparency view is also naturally seen as suggesting that we feel so acquainted with objectual qualities, and 
maybe even with experiences themselves – not as bearers of sui generis qualities, but as acts of acquaintance with 
objectual qualities (this is Chalmers’ view). Hence, it is not clear that proponents of transparency can easily deny 
that we have a problematic intuition of acquaintance of some sort, even if they might deny that we feel acquainted 
with experiential qualities irreducible to presentations of objectual qualities. I think that similar things could be 
said about views such as Alex Byrne’s (Byrne, 2009), according to which experience-talk is misleading, and so 
that there are properly speaking no “experiences”. The detailed discussion of such views falls beyond the scope of 
this paper.  




satisfy many of the properties of what we call acquaintance, without having explained that we 
have a sense of acquaintance. Conversely, one can explain fully our sense of acquaintance in a 
physico-functional framework even if one lacks a physicalist conception of acquaintance itself 
– for example, if one sees acquaintance as merely illusory. Therefore, a physico-functional 
theory of acquaintance and a physico-functional theory of our sense of acquaintance are two 
different things. One can look for the first without bothering about the second, and conversely.4 
Second, some have tried to explain our sense of acquaintance with experiences as the result of 
some sort of mistake that we tend to make, because of the shortcomings of our introspective 
processes. They stressed the fact that introspection provides us only with partial information: 
it tells us in which mental states we are, but is silent on the nature of these states, as well as the 
details of the introspective process. It is then hypothesized that this partial access makes us infer 
mistakenly that introspection gives us some kind of direct, accurate and complete access to our 
mental states. This constitutes our sense of presentation and revelation with conscious states. 
Daniel Dennett has defended a view of this kind (Dennett, 2017, chap. 14). Another source for 
this sort of idea can be found in the work of David Armstrong and his “headless woman illusion” 
defense of materialism (Armstrong, 1968; for a recent defense and a link to our sense of 
revelation, see (Williford, 2020)).5 
Derk Pereboom (Pereboom, 2009, 2011), also sees our sense of acquaintance as the result of a 
mistake that we tend to make because of the shortcomings of introspection. In Pereboom’s 
view, introspection differs from perception, because we have no way to check the accuracy of 
introspective judgments independently of introspection itself (while we can use various 
instruments to check the accuracy of our perceptions). Because of this, we struggle to represent 
possible introspective mistakes. This leads us to infer mistakenly that there simply cannot be 
such introspective mistakes, so that introspection must be direct and revelatory. 
                                                     
4 For the view that acquaintance itself can be naturalized, although our sense of acquaintance can perhaps not be 
fully explained in physical-functional terms, see (Balog, 2020). 
5 This kind of approach is similar to the approach labeled “Introspective Opacity” by David Chalmers in his meta-
problem paper (Chalmers, 2018, p. 22-23). 




These lines of thought all suffer, according to me, from the same flaw. They see our sense of 
acquaintance as the result of some sort of incorrect inference (that we tend to make because of 
the shortcomings of introspection). However, for this reason, they are not in a good position to 
explain the robustness and the persistence of our sense of acquaintance. If our sense of 
acquaintance were the product of some kind of reasoning error or mistaken inference, we 
should be able to get rid of it provided we made the right kind of cognitive effort: the process 
generating our sense of acquaintance should be cognitively penetrable. However, it does not 
seem to be the case. I will not argue at length for this here, as I have developed these arguments 
elsewhere.6 I will assume that a satisfying explanation of our sense of acquaintance has to 
conceive of this sense of acquaintance as an inescapable feature of our cognitive system, and 
not simply as the result of a mistake we tend to make. 
B. Designed certainty views 
One promising line of thought has been put forth recently, first by Wolfgang Schwarz, and then, 
with some modifications, by Andy Clark, Karl Friston and Sam Wilkinson. It provides 
resources to explain our sense that we know our own experiences in some sort of unique and 
peculiar way (our sense of acquaintance) as a direct consequence of some robust feature of our 
cognitive systems. Because this line of thought, as I interpret it, consists in claiming that the 
very design of our cognitive systems leads us to hold beliefs about experiences with certainty, 
I call these views “designed certainty views”.7 
Wolfgang Schwarz (Schwarz, 2018, 2019) originally develops his conception within a Bayesian 
picture – although the point I want to discuss can be abstracted from this framework. He 
suggests that, if we conceive of our cognitive systems as kinds of Bayesian perceivers, which 
need to update their beliefs upon incoming sensory stimuli, it could be advantageous for our 
                                                     
6 I have argued at length against Pereboom’s explanation of our sense that introspection is in some sense infallible 
in (Kammerer, 2018). See (Pereboom, 2019) for Pereboom’s response. Regarding Dennett’s view or views inspired 
by Armstrong, I argued in (Kammerer, 2019a) that it predicts that the processes generating our problem intuitions 
should be cognitively penetrable, while they are not. David Chalmers also criticizes views of this kind (Chalmers, 
2018, p. 22-23), for comparable reasons.  
7 “Certainty” is ambiguous between a psychological and an epistemic meaning (on which I will say more later). I 
use here the psychological sense: beliefs or judgments are (psychologically) certain when they are held with a 
maximal degree of confidence. 




cognitive systems to entertain some absolute certainty towards certain “imaginary” propositions 
in order to facilitate this process of belief updating. The holding of such imaginary propositions 
would track sensory input. The propositions would be held with absolute certainty by the 
system, while the propositions corresponding to the distal fact usually corresponding to the 
sensory input (for example, in the case of a sensory perception of red, the presence of something 
red) would never be judged fully certain (although in standard cases they would be inferred 
with high probability from the imaginary propositions). These imaginary propositions are 
phenomenal propositions, although Schwarz think that they are much more fine-grained that 
the standard examples of phenomenal propositions that we are able to express in natural 
language (“I experience red”, I feel pain”). The key idea is that we should expect our cognitive 
systems to be 100% certain of such phenomenal (“imaginary”) propositions, but not of other 
propositions. 
Andy Clark, Karl Friston and Sam Wilkinson (Clark et al., 2019) accept Schwarz’s conception, 
with some modifications. The most important modifications for our discussion are the 
following8: (A) They think that our cognitive systems hold beliefs about phenomenal 
propositions with high certainty, but not full certainty (and, therefore, not 100% certainty), 
although this high certainty is reported as full certainty at the agentive level (Clark et al., 2019, 
p. 24-25). (B) They claim that holding phenomenal propositions with high certainty is 
compatible with the cognitive system taking a skeptical stance about these phenomenal 
propositions at a meta-level (Clark et al., 2019, p. 25) – more on that later. 
Both Schwarz’s view and Clark et al.’s view aim at solving the meta-problem of consciousness. 
They see this designed certainty feature as central in explaining why we have the intuition that 
consciousness is puzzling, hard to explain, and distinct from the physical (Clark et al., 2019, p. 
30; Schwarz, 2019, p. 224‑225). The designed certainty feature is not supposed to be the whole 
story provided by such accounts when it comes to explaining why consciousness seems 
puzzling. For example, in Schwarz’s account, the fact that this certainty bears on a kind of fact 
which, from the point of view of the system, is “only contingently associated with ordinary 
                                                     
8 Clark, Friston and Wilkinson also develop a rich conception of phenomenality as corresponding to certain mid-
level encodings within the human cognitive system, considered as a hierarchical Bayesian engine. I will not talk 
about these aspects here, even if they are supposed to explain some aspects of our sense of acquaintance (the 
apparent “concreteness” of experience). 




hypotheses about the world” also plays an essential role (Schwarz, 2019, p. 222). In Clark et 
al.’s account, the fact that representations of qualia correspond to mid-level encodings is also 
important. However, I think that it is fair to say that this certainty feature is supposed to be the 
key feature posited by these accounts to explain why we have an intuition of acquaintance.9 
Other features might explain other problems intuitions, but when it comes to the intuition of 
acquaintance, certainty does the heavy lifting.10 
Designed certainty views have a crucial advantage over the other previously mentioned 
physicalist explanations of our sense of acquaintance: in one word, they see our sense of 
acquaintance with experiences as a feature, not a bug. In such views, our tendency to hold 
phenomenal beliefs with certainty is an inescapable property of our cognitive systems, which 
stems from the very design of these systems. Designed certainty views thus escape the objection 
addressed above to other explanations of our sense of acquaintance: they predict that our 
certainty regarding phenomenal experiences will persist in spite of all our efforts – which 
indeed, seems to be what happens. They predict that it will not disappear on reflection, nor after 
the acquisition of new information, as it is not the result of some sort of mistaken inference 
(reasoning error, fallacy, etc.), but an inescapable and cognitively impenetrable feature, inherent 
to the design of our cognitive system.11  
This makes designed certainty views prima facie very attractive. David Chalmers, for instance, 
recently claimed that these views – together with my own view developed in (Kammerer, 
2019c) – are “[a]mong the most promising strategies” to solve the meta-problem of 
consciousness (Chalmers, 2020, p. 203). However, I do not think that designed certainty views 
                                                     
9 Although these accounts are not formulated using the vocabulary of “acquaintance”, I think that it is legitimate 
to interpret them as aiming notably at an explanation of our sense of acquaintance. Indeed, they aim at explaining 
why we have the strong and inescapable impression that we know our own experiences in some uniquely reliable 
way, which makes the puzzling character of consciousness particularly persistent, and renders both standard realist 
materialism and illusionism hard to accept. Moreover, note that, even if it turned out that the intuition of 
acquaintance is not the main explanatory target of these views (not more, say, than other problems intuitions), it 
would still be extremely relevant, for someone who thinks that the intuition of acquaintance is crucial to the meta-
problem, to examine how such views fare when it comes to explaining this intuition. 
10 I do not think that any other feature posited by these views could be interpreted as explanatory of our sense of 
acquaintance. However, if it turns out that these views admit other potential explanans, one can read the following 
arguments as a criticism, not of these views per se, but of a rational reconstruction of these views in which certainty 
towards phenomenal propositions is the explanans of our intuition of acquaintance. 
11 One other advantage (which I will pass over quickly) of designed certainty views is that they see this designed 
certainty feature as an advantageous feature of our cognitive architecture, which makes then these features easier 
to explain evolutionarily. 




are correct. I will now raise two problems for such views. First, I will argue against designed 
certainty views, by showing that it is very doubtful that we are really certain of our own 
experiences, and that if we are, it is only in a sense of “certainty” that does not make this 
experiential certainty distinctive. Second, I will argue that, even if we were certain of our own 
experiences, this would not explain our sense of acquaintance.  
4. Are we really certain of our experiences?  
 
A. Are we really 100% certain of our own experiences? 
Let us start with the first problem for designed certainty views. I claim that it is not plausible 
that we really are certain of our own experiences, if we understand “certainty” as meaning 
100% confidence. Here are three possible counterexamples. 
a) In some (rare) cases, we seem ready to admit that we can commit introspective errors about 
some supposedly obvious properties of our experiences. Pereboom’s “fraternity” case 
(Pereboom, 2011, p. 22‑23)12 thus features a college student initiated into a fraternity. The 
student is shown a sharp razor and is then blindfolded. He is told that the razor is about to cut 
his throat. When he suddenly feels something on his throat, he judges that it is pain – and 
screams. One second later he realizes that he is only having a sensation of cold (an icicle was 
put on his throat instead of a razor). It is reasonable to think that, in this case, the student would 
be ready to admit that his first introspective judgment was mistaken. If that is the case, this 
means that we can sometimes revise our introspective judgments. This goes against the idea 
that we hold our judgments about our own phenomenal experiences with 100% certainty. 
b) Cases where we admit that we make introspective errors are even more common when we 
focus on less obvious properties of our experiences. One classical example concerns the detailed 
character of the visual field. It seems that some people spontaneously judge that their own visual 
                                                     
12 Pereboom borrows this example from from Christopher Hill (Hill, 1991, p. 128-129), who himself borrowed it 
from Rogers Albritton. 




experiences are rich and detailed (e.g. colored) throughout their visual field. Nevertheless, it is 
rather easy to become convinced that our visual field is not thus detailed (e.g. we see no color 
in the peripheral visual field), so that we are the victims of some kind of illusion (Blackmore, 
2002). We should not be able to do that if we were 100% certain of our judgments regarding 
our own phenomenal experiences. 
c) The most radical counterexample to the view that we are 100% certain of our own 
experiences is the fact that there are people who believe that no one (including themselves) has 
phenomenal experiences, even though they recognize that it (non-phenomenally) seems to us 
that we do: philosophers who endorse “strong illusionism” (Frankish, 2016). If humans were 
really forming judgments about their own experiences with 100% confidence, there should be 
no strong illusionists on this planet. 
Of course, someone who holds that we really are 100% certain of our own experiences might 
find answers to these counterexamples. Against the visual field illusion counterexample, they 
might restrict their claim to only some phenomenal judgments (judgments bearing on obvious 
and central properties of our experiences). Against the fraternity case illusion counterexample, 
they might distinguish between existence judgments and classificatory judgments, and hold that 
only the first are held with 100% certainty (they might also want to include some very coarse-
grained classificatory judgments). Against the strong illusionism objection, they could suggest, 
either that strong illusionists do not really believe what they claim to believe (because they are 
insincere, or because they are mistaken about what they really believe), or more plausibly, that 
illusionists’ belief in strong illusionism is located at some sort of meta-level, which does not 
contradict their low-level 100% certainty about their own experiences.13 However, endorsing 
all of these answers leads to a view which seriously departs from designed certainty views as I 
described them above: a view in which the only judgments held with 100% certainty are non-
classificatory phenomenal judgments (or very coarse-grained classificatory judgments) about a 
restricted class of experiences – and this 100% certainty does not transmit to the personal level. 
                                                     
13 This might follow from what Schwarz suggests when he writes : “A system’s world model need not match its 
considered judgments about metaphysical reality” (Schwarz, 2019, p. 225). 




All of this puts some serious pressure on designed certainty views, if we understand “certainty” 
as meaning “100% certainty”. Can we find more hope in a more relaxed understanding of 
“certainty”? 
B. Is near-certainty distinctive? 
Maybe one can escape these difficulties by claiming, as Clark et al. do, that our cognitive 
systems hold beliefs about phenomenal experiences with high certainty or near-certainty, but 
not full certainty – say, with 99.99% confidence, but not 100% confidence. This would certainly 
help us answer the previous objections: if we “merely” have 99.99% confidence in phenomenal 
judgments, it is not that surprising that, in certain (rare) situations, some of us might come to 
doubt or reject some of their phenomenal judgments (see the counterexamples above).14 
However, this view also faces a – different – problem: it seems that we judge many non-
phenomenal propositions with near-certainty – with a very high degree of confidence. Think 
about the propositions that consist in (or imply) the negation of a skeptical scenario: “I have 
two hands”; “I am not a brain in a vat”; “The world has existed for more than 10 seconds”; 
“Other humans have minds comparable to mine”, etc. Think also about many very mundane 
propositions: “My name is François”, “I am not the Queen of the United Kingdom”, etc. It is 
very likely that all these propositions are believed with near-certainty – with a degree of 
confidence neighboring 99.99%. So, near-certainty is in no way distinctive of our beliefs about 
experiences.15 
Moreover, it is quite clear that none of these other facts about which we are nearly certain create 
issues similar to the problem of phenomenal experiences. These facts do not seem to us to be 
directly presented and revealed; we can easily envision possible scenarios in which these facts 
                                                     
14 Note however that it is not for this kind of reason that Clark et al. reject Schwarz’s view that we hold phenomenal 
judgments with 100% certainty. Their own motivation is linked to the way in which multi-level Bayesian updaters 
work : “For technical reasons it is usually not a good idea for the processing itself to reach 100% certainty as this 
locks solutions into place in a way that blocks ongoing multi-level processing” (Clark et al., 2019, p. 25). 
15 This is not to say that full certainty is distinctive of our beliefs about experiences. For example, it is arguably 
believe that we have non-experiential full certainty (say, that 1+1=2). I will discuss that example later. 




do not obtain. Therefore, near-certainty not only is not distinctive of our beliefs about 
experiences; it also fails to capture adequately our impression that experiences are presented in 
a peculiarly direct and revelatory way. This weighs against designed certainty views that would 
understand “certainty” as meaning simply “near-certainty”. 
C. Beyond near-certainty and full certainty: can we have it both ways? 
Claiming that we have full certainty towards our own experiences is problematic, because we 
sometimes doubt or reject some of our introspective judgments about experiences. Claiming 
that we merely have near-certainty is unlikely to explain our impression that experiences are 
presented in a peculiar way, given that near-certainty is not at all distinctive of phenomenal 
judgments. Could we mix the two conceptions, and try to have it both ways? Maybe this is what 
Clark et al. try to do when they make sure to distinguish between our mere near-certainty 
towards experiences, which is computed by sub-personal processes, and the 100% certainty had 
at the “agentive” level, triggered as soon as the sub-personal processes reach a certain 
confidence threshold (Clark et al., 2019, p. 25).  
However, locating our full certainty towards experience at the agentive, personal level (while 
the “probabilistic underpinnings in the whirl of processing” stick to near-certainty) creates some 
serious issues. First, it becomes hard to understand why agents are able to do what Clark and 
collaborators precisely claim they do: “reflect somewhat skeptically about their own sensory 
certainty” (Clark et al., 2019, p. 25). Indeed, if the agentive level were to be the only locus of 
full certainty, skeptical worries precisely should never arise at the level of the agent. Strong 
illusionists, for example, could only be such at a sub-personal level – which seems plainly false. 
If anything, the opposite is true: it seems that it is at the personal level that we sometimes come 
to doubt or reject some of our introspective judgments (this is quite obvious in the strong 
illusionism counterexample). So, limiting our full certainty towards experiences at the personal 
level does not help with these counterexamples. 
Another way to make sense of what Clark and collaborators say requires us to interpret the idea 
that we have 100% agentive certainty regarding experiences as meaning, not that we have 100% 




agentive certainty towards the fact that we have certain experiences, but that we have 100% 
agentive certainty towards the fact that our first-level judgments regarding experiences are 
themselves held with 100% certainty. This interpretation of Clark et al.’s view departs from my 
previous understanding of designed certainty views (as well as from Schwarz’s view), as in this 
interpretation a crucial role is played by the meta-level of second-order judgments regarding 
first-order judgments about experiences. In such “meta-certainty” view, the story goes like this: 
we undergo a number of processes leading to first-level judgments that we have some 
experiences, and these judgments are held with near-certainty (say, with 99.99% confidence). 
Then, at the meta-level, we form the meta-judgment, held with full certainty, that our first-level 
judgments that we have some experiences are held with full certainty. 
I am not certain this is the correct way to interpret the view of Clark et al., as they go very 
quickly on this crucial point (note that all of this is entirely left out in Clark, 2019). However, 
even this sophisticated picture faces obvious objections. If this story were correct, we should 
expect subjects to entertain Moore’s paradoxical statements of the form “P but I believe that 
not P” about their experiences – but they do not. For example, while introspectively 
representing that they are having an experience of red, they should be able to judge at the same 
time (A): “It could be the case that I am not really having an experience of red right now” (given 
that their first-level judgment about their experience of red is only held with 99.99% 
confidence) and (B): “I believe that it could not be the case that I am not really having an 
experience of red right now” (given that they judge that their judgment that they have an 
experience of red is 100% certain). However, we do not make such paradoxical claims. 
It might be that there are other ways to articulate full certainty and near-certainty allowing us 
to have it both ways. However, such an account does not seem to me to be currently available.  
To conclude this section: there is no sense of certainty, such that (i) we are really certain of our 
own experiences; (ii) this certainty is distinctive of our beliefs and judgments about our own 
experiences (which is required to capture our sense that experiences are presented to us in a 
unique way). This gives us a first reason to reject designed certainty views. 




5. Why acquaintance really goes beyond certainty 
Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we ignore this first problem: let us admit that 
we really form judgments about our own present experiences with 100% certainty (suppose we 
have found a way to answer the earlier counterexamples. Here I focus on full certainty, rather 
than on near-certainty or meta-certainty). We would still fall short of explaining our sense of 
acquaintance with experiences. 
Indeed, I believe that our sense of acquaintance with experiences does not require certainty 
towards experiences, but that, even if it did (which is something I am happy to grant here for 
the sake of the argument), it would be much more than that. I will now argue for this. I will first 
show that there is an ontological distinction between certainty towards experiences and our 
sense of acquaintance: certainty cannot constitute our sense of acquaintance. Second, I will 
show that there is a psychological distinction between the two features: certainty would not 
systematically cause a sense of acquaintance. I will focus my attention on certainty, interpreted 
as meaning “full certainty”, but I will also say a few words about near-certainty and meta-
certainty in the footnotes.  
A. The ontological distinction between certainty and our sense of acquaintance 
What kind of feature is certainty towards our own experiences? It is a feature of our judgments 
or beliefs regarding some of our own mental states. These judgments (or beliefs) are to be held 
with a certain degree of confidence, equal to 100% (a bit less for near-certainty). What kind of 
feature, on the other hand, is our sense of acquaintance with experiences? This sense of 
acquaintance, as I noted earlier, is the sense that our own experiences are known in a peculiar 
and unique way, in a way which explains that we experience a persistent intuitive resistance 
both to “standard” materialism, as well as strong illusionism.  A common way to elaborate this 
sense of acquaintance is to see it, for example, as comprising a sense of presentation (a sense 
that our phenomenal experiences are presented to us in some sort of direct, concrete and 
immediate way), and a sense of revelation (a sense that these presentations of phenomenal 
experiences reveal their full nature). However, whatever one’s stance towards these particular 




definitions, what is clear is that this sense of acquaintance consists of intuitions about how 
phenomenal experiences are known. 
Therefore, there is a crucial ontological distinction to make between certainty towards 
experience, a feature of our judgments regarding experiences and our sense of acquaintance, 
an intuition regarding our epistemic relation to experiences. The first feature is a feature of 
introspective judgments, the second feature is a disposition to form certain meta-introspective 
judgments, regarding the kind of introspective access we have to phenomenal experiences (an 
access arguably grounding introspective judgments). So, certainty towards experience and our 
sense of acquaintance are simply two different kinds of things: they are features located at a 
very different cognitive level (introspective level vs meta-introspective level). This gives us a 
strong reason to doubt that the first constitute the second: the two features are ontologically 
distinct. 
Two remarks now: first, if certainty and our sense of acquaintance are so clearly ontologically 
distinct, one can wonder why it might have seemed to some philosophers that explaining the 
first could provide an explanation of the second. Setting aside the possibility of a systematic 
causal link between the two (more on that later), here is a possible explanation. The term 
“certainty” is polysemic (Reed, 2011). On the one hand, it refers to a psychological property: 
the property of a judgment or a belief which is held with a maximal degree of confidence. This 
form of certainty is sometimes called “psychological certainty”: it is the form of certainty 
referred to in designed certainty views discussed here. However, “certainty” can also mean 
something else: epistemic certainty. Beliefs or judgments are epistemically certain when they 
have the highest possible epistemic status (a status which has historically been cashed out in 
terms of indubitability, or infallibility). The two properties are certainly related (plausibly, a 
belief is epistemically certain when one is justified in holding the belief with psychological 
certainty), which means certainty is not a case of mere homonymy – but they can also occur 
seperately. A judgment can be psychologically certain without being epistemically certain 
(think about a subject who is unjustifiably fully confident in one of their beliefs), or 
epistemically certain without being psychologically certain (think about a subject who fails to 
recognize that a given belief has the highest possible epistemic status). Crucially, one plausible 
way to interpret our sense of acquaintance (an intuition about our introspective access to 




experiences) is precisely to see it as the intuition that our introspective access to experiences is 
such that it makes our introspective beliefs about experiences epistemically certain. This might 
have led us to conclude (confusedly) that a view that explains our introspective beliefs about 
experiences as psychologically certain would explain our sense of acquaintance. However, I 
think that a careful distinction between epistemic and psychological certainty helps us when 
distinguishing ontologically between (psychological) certainty towards experiences and our 
sense of acquaintance – and shows that the first does not constitute the second. 
Second: I distinguished between our certainty towards experience and our sense of 
acquaintance, by stressing that the first is a feature that arises at the introspective level, while 
the second arises at the meta-introspective level. One interpretation of the view of Clark et al. 
(the “meta-certainty view” – see section 3.C.), also seems to stress the importance of the meta-
introspective level. Would such a version of designed certainty views be in a better position to 
explain our sense of acquaintance? To answer, one should first acknowledge that such “meta-
certainty views” depart importantly from the designed certainty approach originally put forth 
by Schwarz. It is also very unclear that this meta-certainty view really is the correct 
interpretation of what Clark et al.’s view. Nevertheless, it is true that the meta-certainty view 
seems to give a crucial role to the meta-introspective level – which is precisely where I think 
our sense of acquaintance is located. 
However, the feature it focuses on must also be distinguished ontologically from our sense of 
acquaintance. Indeed, the meta-certainty view states that the crucial explanatory feature is the 
fact that we judge (with full certainty) that our introspective judgments are fully psychologically 
certain. It is then located at the meta-introspective level, but corresponds to judgments made 
about introspective judgments (and their degree of confidence), and not about the introspective 
access or justification which arguably grounds these judgments. On the other hand, our sense 
of acquaintance bears on our introspective access (and the quality of this access), not the 
confidence with which we hold our introspective judgments. Otherwise, our sense of 
acquaintance would not lead us to believe that consciousness must really be as it is 
introspectively presented to us (which is what makes us find consciousness puzzling), but 
simply, at most, to recognize that we have a strong tendency to think so. To understand why 
our sense of acquaintance plays the role it plays in generating our impression that consciousness 




is puzzling and hard to explain, we must recognize that it consists in an intuition about the 
quality (normatively conceived) of our introspective access, and not simply about the 
psychological strength of some of our own beliefs. In other words: our sense of acquaintance is 
the sense that our introspective access gives us epistemically certain beliefs, and it is distinct 
from the belief that introspection makes us form psychologically certain beliefs. This last 
feature is all that the meta-certainty view explains at best. 
B. The psychological distinction between certainty and our sense of acquaintance 
I argued that certainty and our sense of acquaintance are ontologically distinct: they are two 
different things. The first does not constitute the second. However, this is not enough to show 
that designed certainty views cannot explain our sense of acquaintance. Indeed, it might be that, 
although they are ontologically distinct, certainty and our sense of acquaintance are causally 
and psychologically related, as the first systematically causes the second. In that case, the first 
would indeed explain the second. I will now argue that this is not the case: certainty does not 
systematically cause a sense of acquaintance. 
Why do I think certainty does not systematically cause a sense of acquaintance? One first reason 
to think so comes from the case of a priori truths – logical truths, definitional truths, 
mathematical truths (Kammerer, 2019c, p. 125). Take statements such as “1+1=2”, “all 
bachelors are unmarried”, “If P and (PQ), then Q”. Arguably, we are fully certain of the truth 
of these statements, and yet it is not clear that we have a sense of acquaintance with the entities 
involved here. Consider numbers, bachelors, the meaning of the word “bachelor”, or the 
material conditional: none of these entities seem presented to us as experiences are – in the 
same concrete, direct and revelatory way. Therefore, some a priori propositions are believed 
with certainty without us having a corresponding sense of acquaintance. This suggests that 
certainty is not enough to generate a sense of acquaintance.16 
                                                     
16 Certainty here means “full certainty”; but what I said could also apply to meta-certainty (as we arguably believe 
with certainty that we are certain of such a priori truths). As for near-certainty, it encounters even more serious 
problems, given that we are nearly certain of a great deal of very mundane truths – as noted earlier. 




One could object to this counterexample, for two reasons. First, one might point out that a priori 
propositions are justified in very peculiar ways, which sets them apart from a posteriori 
propositions (such as propositions about phenomenal states); and maybe it is only certainty 
regarding a posteriori propositions which generates a sense of acquaintance. One could of 
course wonder why this is so (what is so peculiar about a posteriori certainty?17), but the fact 
that there exists an important difference of status between these propositions (a priori) and 
phenomenal propositions (a posteriori) weakens the counterexample. Second, one might also 
bite the bullet and claim that, in the case of a priori certainty, we do have a sense of acquaintance 
with the corresponding entities (numbers, properties and logical relations). After all, Russell 
himself, who first introduced the concept of knowledge by acquaintance, claimed that we are 
acquainted, not only with what we experiences (sense data), but also with universals (Russell, 
1912) – with numbers, properties and relations. Whether we really have a sense of acquaintance 
with such entities might of course be discussed (most people do not think that properties – say, 
being a prime number or being a grandmother – are presented to them in the same concrete 
way as their experiences!), but the thesis is defensible. For these two reasons, even if the case 
of a priori truths should make us suspicious of the idea that certainty systematically causes a 
sense of acquaintance, we should try to argue against this thesis without relying on this one 
counterexample. 
Now, let us turn to a thought experiment designed to show that certainty does not systematically 
cause a sense of acquaintance. This only involves a posteriori propositions. 
Martian Faith: You wake up one morning with the definitive and overwhelming 
conviction that there is intelligent life on Mars. You are (psychologically) 100% 
certain of this; and you are also (psychologically) 100% certain that you indeed 
have this kind of certainty. You would bet your life a thousand times on there being 
intelligent Martians, without hesitation. Now, when you ask yourself “how do I 
know it?”, you admit you did not go to Mars – nor were you contacted by Martians. 
In fact, you do not have any reason to believe that there is intelligent life on Mars 
– not in the ordinary sense of reason, that is, other than the mere fact that you take 
                                                     
17 See my footnote 7 for elements in Clark et al.’s account, which might help here. 




this to be true. It just happened to you: you woke up one morning believing that 
there are intelligent aliens on Mars (the true cause of your belief might be, say, a 
very localized brain stroke that occurred during the night, but you need not know 
that). You might then come up with hypotheses about how your “knowledge” was 
obtained. Maybe you received some sort of divine revelation? Maybe you secretly 
have some super-human faculty of intuition? Maybe you saw the Martians, and 
were then treated with some sort of Men In Black memory-erasure technology 
(“neuralyzer”), which did not work properly, as it suppressed all particular 
memories of your encounter, but left you with this one single piece of knowledge? 
Maybe you are just incredibly lucky, and formed an irrational belief (perhaps 
because of some localized brain stroke!) that simply happened to be true? At any 
rate, you also easily recognize that these are mere hypotheses, and that they might 
very well turn out to be false. The only thing you are unshakably certain of is the 
fact that there is intelligent life on Mars.  
In Martian Faith, someone develops full certainty (as well as meta-certainty, say – certainty 
that one is certain) towards a given a posteriori proposition (that there is intelligent life on 
Mars) but fails to develop any robust sense of acquaintance regarding the corresponding 
entities. The story tries to make it palpable that you can have unshakable faith in something (the 
existence of the Martians) without having a robust and persisting impression that you have some 
sort of special epistemic access to that thing (what happens on Mars). 
Martian Faith describes what could follow from developing full certainty regarding a certain 
proposition; it shows that a sense of acquaintance does not have to ensue. Is this aspect of 
Martian Faith psychologically plausible? I hope the story gives the reader a sense that it is; but 
if it is, then that means that there is no systematic psychological causal relation from full 
certainty and meta-certainty to a sense of acquaintance (obviously, near-certainty would not 
help here). This suggests that there is no systematic psychological link between certainty (of 
any kind) and a sense of acquaintance. This gives a reason to deny that designed certainty views 
explain our sense of acquaintance. 




Proponents of designed certainty views might push back on this, in at least two ways. First, they 
could argue that, even though there might be no systematic causal relation between certainty 
and a sense of acquaintance, there could nevertheless be a causal relation in some cases. After 
all, the protagonist of Martian Faith comes up with hypotheses to account for their sudden 
knowledge of extraterrestrial facts. Could we not imagine that, in some cases, someone in that 
situation ends up believing strongly in some of these hypotheses – maybe, precisely, the ones 
that imply that facts about Mars are immediately presented and revealed to the protagonist? 
This would come close to believing in some form of acquaintance with Martian facts. If 
something similar happens in the case of phenomenal experiences, then designed certainty 
views could contribute to explain our sense of acquaintance with experiences. 
This seems like a plausible story. The only problem is that it would make our sense of 
acquaintance the result of some kind of reasoning – by which we come to form and embrace a 
hypothesis. This, in turn, should make our sense of acquaintance the result of a cognitively 
penetrable process. One should be able, with enough attention and effort, to distinguish between 
what one cannot control (one’s certainty that one is conscious) and the hypotheses one makes 
regarding the origin and justification of such certainty. This would make designed certainty 
views close to older views that see our sense of acquaintance as the result of some (possibly 
mistaken) reasoning process, which we should be able to control and inhibit if necessary. I 
presupposed earlier the falsity of such views, and I think that designed certainty views would 
lose a great part of their appeal if they concluded that our sense of acquaintance was a mere 
hypothesis – that we are free to endorse or to reject – rather than something unavoidable. 
Second, proponents of designed certainty views might maintain that there is in fact a systematic 
psychological connection between certainty and a sense of acquaintance, and that Martian Faith 
is not psychologically plausible. I find Martian Faith extremely plausible, but it is, after all, a 
mere thought experiment: it might be that I am simply wrong when I imagine what would 
happen if I became suddenly fully certain of something (armchair psychology has – justifiably 
– a bad reputation). However, some empirical facts can help me strengthen my case here. 
Indeed, some actual situations can be read as (imperfect) real-life equivalents of Martian Faith: 
monothematic delusions. In monothematic delusions (Bortolotti, 2018), subjects hold, with 
great conviction, and in a way resistant to counter-argumentation, beliefs which are usually 




judged “strange”, if not plainly absurd. The delusions are monothematic when they concern 
only one theme (subjects do not tend to hold strange beliefs about other topics). Classic 
examples of such delusions include the Capgras delusion (the delusional belief that an impostor 
has replaced a relative or a spouse) and the Cotard delusion (subjects believe of themselves that 
they are disembodied, dead, or nonexistent). 
Many delusional subjects seem able to recognize the strangeness of their beliefs. Yet, they do 
not systematically tend to form supplementary beliefs about their hypothetical access to 
supplementary information, which would lend support to their delusions. In other words: in 
many cases, delusional subjects believe with unshakable certainty that a strange fact obtains 
and they recognize the strangeness or their belief, without developing a sense that they have a 
special and unique access to such a strange fact (which would ground their certainty). Here, for 
example, is what a Capgras subject (S) said, when asked about their beliefs: 
E : Isn't that [two families] unusual ? S : It was unbelievable. E : How do you 
account for it ? S : I don't know. I have tried to understand it myself and it was 
virtually impossible. E : What if I told you I don't believe it ? S : That's perfectly 
understandable. In fact, when I tell the story, I feel that I'm concocting a story… it's 
not quite right, something is wrong. E : If someone told you the story what would 
you think ? S : I would find it extremely hard to believe. I should be defending 
myself. (Alexander et al., 1979, p. 335). 
Here is a Cotard subject (LU), who believes that she is dead, but confesses that she has no idea 
of how she died: 
When asked how she thought she had died, LU replied “I don’t know how. Now I 
know that I had a flu and came here on 19th November. Maybe I died of the flu.” 
(McKay & Cipolotti, 2007, p. 353) 




Even when they give justifications for their beliefs, delusional subjects often seem to provide 
justifications which are very different from a hypothetical appeal to “acquaintance”. These 
justifications might consist in appeals to mundane and ordinary facts (which would ordinarily 
be judged insufficient to justify the kind of extraordinary beliefs held by the subjects). For 
example, a Capgras subject who believed that her daughter had been replaced by an impostor 
gave two justifications for her belief. (A) The person she believes to be an impostor (in fact, 
her daughter) had worn too much makeup compared to her real daughter, and (B) there was 
some incoherence in the information she received regarding the distance of the workplace of 
the person who claimed to be her daughter (Luca et al., 2013, p. 1096). 
None of this is proof that even some delusional subjects lack a sense of acquaintance with the 
fact they are delusional about, but it strongly suggests so. Indeed, if all delusional subjects (or 
even simply most of them) developed a sense of acquaintance regarding the strange fact they 
are delusional about, we should expect this sense of acquaintance to show up in their answers 
when they are asked to defend their beliefs. However, this does not seem to be the case. 
Therefore, the case of monothematic delusions supports the idea that believing with certainty 
that some facts obtain does not reliably cause a sense of acquaintance with the same facts. Of 
course, objections could be opposed to this argument from monothematic delusions. It might 
be that delusional subjects do in fact have a sense of acquaintance with the facts they are 
delusional about, but that it did not show up in their answers because they were not 
appropriately probed. It might also be that their delusions are not proper beliefs (Berrios, 1991; 
Currie, 2000), or maybe that, even though they are beliefs, they are not really held with 
certainty. Finally, it might be that delusional subjects hold their delusional beliefs with 
certainty, and that they lack a sense of acquaintance, but only because the mechanism normally 
responsible for the causal link between certainty and the sense of acquaintance breaks down in 
their case. After all, they are pathological subjects, and we should not expect their cognitive 
functioning to mirror exactly the functioning of “normal” subjects. 
Nevertheless, even if all these answers are available in principle, they all have in turn a certain 
cost. So, I think it is fair to say that, taken together with the cases of a priori truths and the 
plausibility of Martian Faith, the case of monothematic delusion puts some very serious 




pressure on the thesis that psychological certainty systematically causes a sense of 
acquaintance. 
Therefore, certainty about experiences does not constitute our sense of acquaintance with 
experiences, and it does not plausibly cause it systematically either. Hence, certainty about 
experiences does not explain our sense of acquaintance with experiences. 
6. Conclusion 
Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires explaining our sense of acquaintance with 
experiences. While designed certainty views might have appeared as promising candidate 
theories to explain such a sense of acquaintance, they must be rejected. It is doubtful that we 
really hold phenomenal beliefs with certainty (at least in a sense of certainty that would be 
distinctive enough of phenomenal beliefs). Moreover, even if we did hold phenomenal beliefs 
with certainty, this would not account for our sense of acquaintance, given that certainty would 
not constitute nor systematically cause such a sense of acquaintance. We should look away 
from certainty in our search for an explanation of our sense of acquaintance. My own view, 
developed and defended elsewhere (Kammerer, 2019c, 2019b), is that our sense of 
acquaintance derives from the content of our introspective representations: we represent 
phenomenal consciousness, so to speak, as an entity with which we are in a certain kind of 
epistemological relation – a relation that philosophical elaboration presents under the guise of 
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